It was a pleasure to participate in the UCL colloquium on 'Law and Michael Freeman' (a truly global oral Festschrift) in tribute to a friend, colleague and collaborator1 for more decades than either of us might wish to recall.
The Application of Positivist Jurisprudential Models to Religious Law2
Secular jurisprudence, particularly in the positivist tradition, has paid relatively little attention to the phenomenon of religious law, but both the exceptions and the silences can prove instructive. For Austin (see now Freeman and Mindus, 2013) , 'divine law' fell within the genus of law 'properly so called' ('A law, in the most general and comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed, may be said to be a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him' (Austin, 1954:10) ), since God was conceived as an intelligent being with power over humanity. Indeed, Austin was quite explicit on this: 'Of laws properly so called, some are set by God to his human creatures, others are set by men to men' (Ibid: 122. Cf. 'The divine laws and positive laws are laws properly so called', ibid: 1). Divine law failed, however, the test of the narrower species of 'positive law', not being 'set by political superiors to political inferiors' and failing the test of sovereignty: If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent (Austin, 1954:194) .
The test, notwithstanding its fuzzy edges, is widely regarded as reflecting Austin's commitment to philosophical (empiricist) positivism, designed to construct a jurisprudence which could stand up to scientifĳic scrutiny. Kelsen also accepted the possibility of a "religious norm system" which did not, however, pass his test for positive law. Such a system would have a Grundnorm: "The basic norm of a religious norm system says that one ought to behave as God and the authorities instituted by Him command" (Kelsen, 1946:115) , where the source of authority was not the fact (real or supposed) of divine command but rather "the tacitly presupposed norm that one ought to obey the commands of God" (Kelsen, 1967:193-94 ). Kelsen's radical separation of fact and norm allowed him to avoid any empirical questions about the actual existence of either God or divine command. Nor did the Grundnorm depend on conscious acceptance by either the community or its offfĳicials, or even conscious knowledge of it on their part. It was, in his view, a logical presupposition of which they might be wholly unaware, but which provided the logical basis of their experience of legal validity (applying the Husserlian understanding of Kelsen's Grundnorm) (Kelsen, 1967: 202; Jackson, 1985: 238-234; 1996: 111-112, 127) .3 However, such a system of religious law would not be a system of positive law, since the latter must use socially immanent rather than transcendental sanctions, i.e. "those that according to the faith of the individuals subjected to the order originate from a superhuman authority", which Kelsen appears to understand (only) in terms of "punishment by a superhuman authority", an example of which is given as "the illness or death of the sinner or punishment in another world" (Kelsen, 1947: 20-21 ). Kelsen does not appear to envisage a religious legal system in which authority is delegated to human agencies to apply socially immanent sanctions. To the extent that religious legal systems do so, they would appear to fulfĳil his defĳinition of positive law. Of course, he would apply here the same argument which he uses in relation to the position of a Marxist within a capitalist legal system.4 The subject within a religious legal system
